Since the humanitarian response to the 1994 Rwanda genocide, there has been agrowing body of literature on quality and accountability in humanitarian action. Oneof the most recent trends has been a focus on humanitarian cooperation betweenthe governments of disaster affected countries and other humanitarian actors. Theresearch presented in this book builds on this trend by comparing two governmentalrecovery agencies, namely the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) and theAceh Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR).Through a review of the literature on policy transfer, the creation of an integratedconceptual/analytical framework for policy transfer and the application of Lijphartscomparative method, the research attempts to identify both whether or not policytransfer occurred between the two contexts, as well as the possible causes for thedifference in both agencies ability to build back better. The outcomes of the researchare then used to suggest possible areas of future research and related hypotheses.

Text Sample:Chapter 4, Policy Transfer: a Conceptual/Analytical Framework:A comparison of the BRR and IHRC would be incomplete without first looking at some of the existing frameworks on policy transfer and the use of knowledge in informing policy frequently used in the fields of comparative politics and development studies (Dolowitz& Marsh, 2000). It is particularly relevant, as the mission and the mandate of the IHRC are modelled after the successful approach after the tsunami in South Asia(IHRC, 2011: 10), with specific mention of the BRR (IHRC, 2011; Bridges et al., 2010). Furthermore, as a result of globalisation and the increasing severity of disasters (thus requiring the creation of ad hoc agencies), direct policy transfer between governments is all the more probable for the foreseeable future. The theoretical frameworks presented in this section will seek to explain what causes and impacts on the process of transfer as well as how processes of policy transfer lead to particular policy outcomes (Evans, 2009: 254). This implies viewing policy transfer as both dependent (conceptual framework) and independent (analytical framework) variables (Dolowitz& Marsh, 2000).This book employs the terms policy transfer, lesson drawing and emulation interchangeably. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 344) argue that policy transfer, emulation and lesson drawing all refer to a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions in another time and/or place. In addition, policy transfer covers such heterogeneous concepts, including policy diffusion, policy convergence, policy learning and lesson-drawing, under the umbrella heading of policy transfer. (Evans, 2009: 254). As policy learning falls under policy transfer in the Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) framework, it allows for complementation by the Weyrauch& Langou (2011) and Jones et al. (2009) frameworks.The following two sub-sections will examine policy transfer as both a dependent and independent variable. The key policy transfer processes identified can be used both conceptually by viewing policy transfer as the dependent variable as well as analytically by viewing policy transfer as an independent variable and thereby addressing specific objective four. Using the integrated conceptual/analytical framework presented in this book, one of Yins (2003) previously mentioned preconditions for case study research is fulfilled; predicting contrasting results for predictable reasons based on theory.This section addresses specific objective one.4.1, Policy Transfer as a Dependent Variable:Dolowitz and Marshs policy transfer framework focuses on five processes of transfer:1. What is transferred? Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) make a categorisation ranging from the transfer of ideas and attitudes, to the transfer policy goals and policy content, including negative lessons. As opposed to the frameworks by Weyrauch and Langou (2011) and Jones et al. (2009), Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) make a greater distinction between different aspects of policy (e.g. content and instruments) as well as policy and programmes. In line with the scope of this study and the radical nature of the IHCR in terms of lesson drawing, it is more relevant to use the broader interpretation of policy used by Weyrauch and Langou (2011: 7):Policy encompasses both decisions and processes, including the design, implementation and evaluation of the intervention. Policy is defined as a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors (Anderson, 1975, in Pollard& Court, 2005). This definition, of course, goes beyond documents or legislation, to include agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, policy implementation and policy evaluation activities.Weyrauch and Langou (2011), focussing specifically on impact evaluations, identify what is transferred as the level of policy influence, whilst the closely related degree of transfer is characterised as the dimension of policy influence.2. Why transfer? (Political Context) This question concerns itself with why policy makers decide to engage in a particular degree of transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) conceptualise this transfer as lying on a continuum, with voluntary lesson drawing at one end and coercive transfer at the other end.This continuum is based on the assumption that actors decide to draw lessons from other policies on the basis of rationality and dissatisfaction with the status quo. Transferring policy is a cheap solution compared to conducting ones own research and devising ones own policies. However, actors rarely act rational and are influenced by a number of externalities including incomplete information or, moving towards the coercive side of the spectrum, powerful outside actors that can influence (national) policy. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) argue that most policy transfers will lie somewhere in the middle of the continuum. They further remind us that the degree of coerciveness will largely depend on the actors involved and their motivations. Finally, the opportunity for coercive policy transfer is heightened by crisis situations. Particularly this last point is also emphasised by Jones et al. (2009) and Weyrauch and Langou (2011) and will be elaborated on in the next sub-section.