It is an obvious fact that human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort. Contributors include distinguished researchers in their respective fields and the book thus presents state-of-the-art theory. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced philosophy, economics and social science classes.

Preface. Rationality: Coherence and Structure; J. Nida-Rümelin. The Rationality of Rules; E.F. McClennen. Constitutions as External Constraints? R. Zintl. The Realizations of Social Norms among Rational Actors; T. Voss. A Rationalization of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma; W. Spohn. Intentions and the Shaping of One''s Decision Problems; M. Rechenauer. The Motivating Power of Expectations; R. Sugden. Structural Reasons in Rational Interaction; T. Schmidt. Convergence to a Signaling System Equilibrium; B. Skyrms. Words and Deeds: A Focus Theory of Norms; C. Bicchieri. Motives, Rules, and Rationality; M. Slote. Instrumental Reasoning; J. Broome. List of Contributors.